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Towards  a  world  agricultural policy on  the  same  lines as  the EEC's 
I 
A.  Agricultural  backF,round  to  the  Kennedy  Round 
The  EEC  Treaty requires  the  Community  not  only to  weld  the 
hitherto  self-contained national agricultural markets  into  a  single 
whole  vrith  the  same  characteristics as  a  domestic  market,  but  also 
to  develop  an  agricultural policy in keeping with the  objectives laid 
down  in /.rticles 39  and  110 1  viz: 
(a)  to  raise  farm  incomes  by  increasing productivity; 
(b)  to  stabilize markets,  in other  words  to  strike  a  balance 
between  supply  and  demand; 
(c)  to  gu~rantee supplies  and  ensure  that  they  are  delivered to 
the  consumer  at  reasonable  prices; 
(d)  to  contribute  to  the  harmonious  development  of world  trade, 
It was  certainly not  by  chnnce  that  the  authors of the  Rome 
Treaty set  standards  for  the  Community's  farm  policy of  a  kind 
un~recedented in agriculture,  at least in the  six member  countries. 
It was  with  some  justification,  then,  that  the  principles  behind 
this policy were  felt  to  be  a  revolutionary  break with  the past. 
Conservative  policy mnkers  nevertheless  took  the  view  that  the 
principles  implied  a  policy of  concentrating wholly  on the  economic 
aspects of agriculture,  which  they  said was  impracticable. 
Despite  all opposition,  the  common  agricultural policy i!. virtually 
complete,  as  far  as  legislative processes  are  concerned,  since  the  CounaLl 
decisions  of  15  December  1964,  and it is now  shaping both  the  trend 
of  furming  in the  Community  and  our  relations  v1ith  the  rest of the 
world, 
The  implications of the  common  agricultural policy for  Community 
farming  are: 
1.  Free  trade,  from  1 July  1967  onwards,  between six countries  which 
were  previously surrounded by protective walls.  This  means 
unrestricted competition with  the  same  rules  for  everyone,  so  that 
production will gravitate  towards  the  arens  of the  Community  where 
conditions  are  most  favourable. 
2.  A policy of balance  between  production  nnd  demand  - the  only  way 
to  place  agricultural markets  on  a  sound  footing. 
3·  A common  price policy as  a  result of which  both producer  and 
consumer  prices will be  stabilized at  a  level which satisfies the 
requirements of efficient  producers.  The  Community's  agricultural 
policy is thus  stripped of the  element  which,  in the  eyes  of  the 
world,  was  a  major  source  of market  disorder - subsidies  for 
uneconomic  producers. \ 
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While it has  been  largely determined  by  economic  requirements, 
the  common  agricultural policy does  not  ignore  social problems.  It 
is not  the  EEC's  intention to  abandon  the  numerous  farmers  who  will 
be  forced  out  of agriculture  as  a  result of technical  progress  and 
the  limited capacity of  the  human  stomach.  This is a  separate  topic 
which  cannot  be  gone  into here,  but it is being given  the  closest 
attention. 
In adopting the  common  agricultural policy,  the  EEC  drew  the 
logical  consequences  from  the  refutation,  at least in industrial 
countries,  of the  Malthusian  doctrine  that population  grows  faster 
than  the  production of goods  and  that  a  community  can  therefore 
expand  only if it acquires  new  land  on  which  to  grow  food. 
Given  a  rational  economic  policy  and  technical progress,  it 
should  also  be  possible  to  solve  the  problems  of the  affluent  society. 
They  at least  look easier to  solve  than  the  problems of ,an  impoverished 
society,  whose  members,  either individually or collectively,  can only 
thrive  at the  expense  of others. 
B,  The  EEC  is not  self-supporting 
Vfuat  effects has  the  EEC  agricultural policy or market  integration 
had  on  its relations with  the  rest of the  world?  As  is common 
knowledge,  the  Community  is an  industrial entity,  deriving more  than 
20%  of its gross  product  from  foreign  trade,  Rnd  cannot  therefore 
afford to be  self-sufficient,  Let  us  see  what  the  figures  say. 
1.  Total  imports of agricultural produce  including tropical  and 
primary  farm  products rose  from  $7  356  million in  1958  to  ~9 438 
million in  1963,  an  increase of 28.3%•  Imports  in the  first half 
of 1964  were  worth $5  330  million. 
Figures  by  area shovr  that  farm  imports  from  industrial countrier: 
rose  by  39.  2?~,  from  developing  countries  14%  and  from  state-
trading  countrie.s  87.2%. 
2.  Imports  from  all non-member  countries of  farm  products which  have 
been  subject  to  common  regulations since  1  August  1962  (cereals, 
pigment,  poultry,  eggs,  fruit,  vegetables  and  wine)  went  up  from 
$1  753  million in 1958  to $1  995  million in  1963,  an  increase  of 
13.8%.  The  figure  for  the  first half of  1964  was  $1  150 million. 
Here  too  the  increase  varied according  to  source  of imports. 
While  those  from  industrial countries  were  up  by 34.5% 1  and  as 
much  as  108%  in the  case  of the  USA,  imports  from  the  developing 
countries  fell  by  11.9%,  and  the  figure  for  state-trading countries 
rose  by  46?~. 
Those  figures  show  that  the  industrial countries have  derived 
considerably more  benefit  from  the  expanding  Community  market  than 
the  underdeveloped  countries,  although  the latter's needs  arc 
greatest,  This is doubtless  because  the  industriel countries 
arc  stepping up  their agricultural production as  well  faster  than \ 
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theu can  consume it and  are  also  rich  enough  to  get  rid of their 
surpluses  on  the  world  market  by resorting to artificial  measures~ 
In  so  doing,  they clearly compete  with  the  developing countries 
and  force  down  the  price  and  volume  of their exports. 
While  it certainly cannot  be  denied  that  the  primary  aim  of the 
common  agricultural policy  \'W.S  to  find  an  answer  to  the  Community's 
internal problems,  our relations with  non-member  countries  were 
nevertheless  taken  into  consideration  from  the  outset.  Although 
Article  110  of  the  Rome  Treaty,  calling  on  the  Member  States to 
contribute  towards  the  development  of world  trade,  also  applies 
to  agriculture,  the  Council  deemed it necessary to  emphasize  this 
point  by  writing a  special clause  into  each of the  more  recent 
market  regulations,  stipulating that it must  be  applied with  due 
regard to  the  aims  set out both in Article  39  (agriculture)  and in 
Article  110  (international trade)  of the  Treaty.  The  Community  is 
thus  committed to  support  endeavours to  promote  world  trade  - a 
commitment  which will scarcely be  found  in any  other agricultural 
policy  anywhere. 
In  the  course  of the  ~ennedy Round,  the~ the  Community  has 
tabled concrete  proposals  for  what  amounts  to  an international 
agricultural  code.  The  ideas  contained in the  proposals  are  not 
new,  since  they were  first put  to  the  members  of GATT  by  the 
Community  as early as  1958;  their purpose is to  set  the  world's 
agricultural markets  in order  and  make  them  work  better. 
The  need  for this becomes  obvious  when  we  look at  the 
structure of world  trade.  In  1963,  world  exports totalled roughly 
$1Lf3  000  million,  of which  just on $42  000  million,  some  .30% 7  \vcre 
accounted  for  by  farm  produce  including primary products.  So 
agriculture still claims  a  large  share· of world trade,  which is 
why  every  country enters into  bilateral and  multilateral  agreements 
leying  down  rights  and  obligations  in  the  matter of imports  and 
exports of  farm  produce. 
II 
A.  The  twin  aspects of the  problem  of  world  trade  in farm  produce 
Thanks  to  improved  techniques,  both  crop  and  livestock 
production in most  countries is growing  at  a  rate  and  on  a 
scale  hitherto  unknown.  Hardly  any  country has effective 
machinery  for  regulating supply,  since  producer prices are  fixed 
in accordance  with political criteria (parity between agriculture 
and  induDtry,  national security,  etc.). 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I '  - 5  - \ 
(b)  Demand 
Demand  from  countries in a  position to  pay  for  their 
purchases is not  keeping pace  with  increases in supply. 
Surpluses  are  stockpiled or,  bypassing  normal  trade  channels,  find 
their way  to  countries  whose•national  incom~s1or  foreign~currency 
holdincs  arc  tog  low  to  provide  an  effectiye  backing  for  demand. 
While  the  imbalance  between  supply  and  demand  affects inter-
national trade  policy,  its cnusm must  be  sought  elsewhere.  They 
are  to  be  found  in agricultural  and  development  policy.  It is here 
the.t  efforts must  be  brouGht  to  bear if world trade  in  farm  produce 
is to  be  placed on  the  sound  footing  of structural balance  between 
supply  and  demand. 
Those  responsible  for  external  and  - even more  - for  trade policy 
are  fully  aware  of this.  Whut  have  they  done? 
As  far  as  development  problems  are  concerned,  both  the  developed 
and  the  developing  countries  have  decided to  merge  their national 
policies to  form  a  single  international policy. 
With  regard to  agricultural problems,  however,  no  decision has 
yet  been  taken  to  subordinate  national policies to international 
discipline. 
B.  Will  the  Kennedy  Round  be  a  turning point? 
The  EEC 1s  answer  to  this question is  11yes11 ,  since  the  Kennedy 
Round  has certain basic  features  which  make  it the  proper  forum  to 
tackle,  and  finally master,  the  ever-growing crisis in world 
agricultural trade.  The  features  which  the  EEC  has  in  mind  are  as 
follovrs. 
The  Kennedy  Round  covers  the  entire  ranBe  of both industrial 
and agricultural products, 
Instead of the  traditional item-by-item method,  negotiations 
are  being conducted  on  a  linear basis,  which  means  that every member 
of  GATT  accepts  commitments  in respect of all  farm  products. 
Commitments  must  be  made  on  a  reciprocal basis;  in other words, 
each  contracting party must  assume  the  same,  or at least equivalent, 
commitments  in respect  of each  product, 
Rules  and procedures  have  still to  be  worked  out  for  the 
agricultural part of the  Kennedy  Round  and  provision made  for general 
agreements  on  a  number  of products  such  as  cereals,  meat  and  milk 
products. 
C,  The  EEC's  plan( 1) 
Rith  those  considerations in mind,  the  EEC  has  worked  out  a  plan 
containing  the  rules  and  procedure  which it feels  should  be  applied 
(1)  See  Newsletter  No.  17/1964. \  - 6-
to  the  agricultural part of the  Kennedy  Round.  This  plan was 
submitted to  GATT  on  18  February  1964, 
The  procedur~ propooed  defines  the  basis  on  which  commitments 
are  to  be  made  by  the  contracting parties.  Whereas  commitments  made 
in the  industrial sector are  based  on  customs  duties,  the  EEC  has 
proposed  a  different  basis  for  agriculture,  namely  the  margin of 
support. 
The  rules of negotiation put  forward  by  the  EEC  provide  that 
margins  of support  should  be  bound  at  their present level. 
D,  The  margin-of-support  method  and~y the  tariff approach is not  enoug£ 
Customs  duties  are  still the  main  instrument  of protection in 
the  induc.trial sector  but  no  longer play a  dominant  role in 
agriculture.  A good  number  of  contracting parties have  repl~ced 
duties on  major  farm  products  by  other instruments of support  such  as 
import  monopolies  and levies.  In many  other instances,  customs 
duties have  been  retained but  coupled  with  other instruments of 
agricultural  support  (government  market  intervention,  production 
subsidies,  compulsory  mixing  regulations,  quantitative  restrictions, 
import  chRrges,  export  subsidies,  etc.). 
Customs  duties  are  thus  no  longer  the  common  pillar of agricultural 
support in all n2tional  systems.  But  the  contracting parties cannot 
simply  be  expected to  replace  their nRtional  systems  by  a  single 
instrument  of support  for  the  sole  purpose  of providing  a  common 
basis  for  commitments  made  under  the  Kennedy  Round.  Instead,  we 
must  work  on  the  assumption  that  national  support  systems  will 
continue, 
But  national support  systems,  no  matter  how  widely they differ, 
have  one  thing in  common  and  that is their overall effect. 
The  incidence  of  a  support  system is equal to the  difference 
between: 
(n)  the  prico  which  the  nntional  producer  receives  for the  product 
and 
(b)  the  normal  price  at  which  similar  foreign  products of comparable 
quality are  offered at the  national  fronti.er  (reference price). 
Thio  difference is what  the  EEC  calls the  margin  of support, 
<md  it cnn  be  expressed as  a  figure. 
The  EEC  proposCA  that  the  margin  of support  be  taken  as  a  basis 
for  the  commitments  to  be  assumed  by  the  contracting parties. 
The  EEC's  own  commitments  will  not  be  based  on  the  margins  of 
support  granted  by  the·individunl,Member States but  on  those 
resulting  from  the  common  agricultural policy. - 7  -
E.  The  rules governing  the  margin of  support 
Basic  commitmen~ 
All  contracting parties,  including the  EEC,  will  bind  the 
margin  of support  for  each  farm  product  at its current  level. 
Countries in 'irhich  the  margin is nil will undertake  not  to introduce 
support  measures  for  the  product  in question. 
If the  world  market  price  falls  below  the  reference  price,  the 
margin  of support will automatically be  increased by  the  difference 
behrecn the  two.  If the  world  market  price rises  above  the  rc ference 
price,  the  margin of support  can  only be  maintained at  the  existing 
level after consultation between the  contracting parties. 
The  margin of support  will initially be  bound  for  a  period of 
three  years.  Before  this period expires,  the  contracting parties 
will negotiate  new  commitments  for  the  following  three  years. 
If the  balance  between  supply  nnd  demand  is likely to  be  disturbed 
as  a  result of the  trend of production  in.~ contracting parties, 
consideration may  be  given  to  adjusting the  reference  price.  But if 
this occurs only in one  or two  contracting parties,  an  adjustment  of 
their  m<~gins of support  should  be  contemplated. 
Each  contracting party may,  for  compelling reasons,  terminate 
the  binding  of the  margin of support.  In this  case,  compensation 
must  be  offered to  the  other contracting parties, 
Additional  commitments  assumed  by  individual  contracting parties 
Any  country may,  of its own  accord,  assume  more  far-rea.ching 
commitments  in respect  of  one  or  more  farm  products. 
For  instance,  a  country  could offer to  bind  the  margin of 
support  at  a  level  lower  than the  current  one  or bind  one  of the 
components  in its support  system  for  a  given  product  - such  as  the 
feed-conversion rate  in the  support  system  for  poultry. 
/,dditiono.l  commitments  in respect  of individual  products 
World  agreements  based on  the  following principles will be 
concluded in respect  of products  such  as  cereals,  beef  and veal, 
butter,  sugar  and  oleaginous  fruit,  which  account  for  a  large 
proportion of tmrld  trode  but  cuffur  from  n  lnck of  baltt11<..:e  betweeu 
supply  and  demnnd. 
Contracting parties will pursue  a  production policy designed 
to prevent  surpluses. \"}':lore  surpluses  seem  likely to  accumulate  1  they 
will  take  stops to  cut  back  supply  and  even  production if necessary. - 8  -
Before  taking steps to  limit  production,  the  contracting 
partien will  examine  what  can  be  done  to stimulate  the  demand 
in a  number  of  countries that  has  not  been satisfied through 
either  commercial  or  11non-commercial11  channels. 
Contracting parties exporting through  "non-commercial"  channels 
will observe  the  principles  and  procedures  which  have  been or will 
be  recommended  by  FAO  or  other international bodies. 
The  contracting parties will stabilize world  trade  prices by 
agreeing  on  reference  prices and  ensuring their enforcement  through 
the  machinery  of import  and  export procedures. 
These  prices will be  fixed  at  a  level which  ensures  a  fair 
return  to  exporting  countries~  and  satisfies the  desire  of importing 
countries to  safeguard  the  legitimate interests of their consumers 
and  the  stability of their  finances. 
F.  Will  the  plan be  accepted? 
The  chief objections to  the  plan  are  summarized  below: 
(a)  Until  15  December  1964  there  was  some  doubt,  both  inside  and 
outside  the  Community,  whether  the  EEC  would  be  able  to  agree 
on  the  common  prices without  which  the  plan  cannot  work.  This 
has  now  been  done  for  cereals,  and  every effort  must  be  made 
to lay down  common  prices for  other  farm  products  (beef and 
veal,  milk1  rice,  etc.)  in 1965. 
(b)  \'lhile  the  ~EC Hember  States  agree  that  commitments  are  also 
required in respect  of national  farm  policies,  certain 
exporting  countries  go  fu~ther calling for  an  undertaking 
from  importing  countries  to  make  purchases  to  a  specified 
amount.  Some  importing  countries  seem  willing to  go  along 
with  this - the  concept  of  the  division of markets. 
The  EEC  rejects it for  two  reasons,  which  can  be 
explained  by  taking  the  case  of  cereals: 
1.  An  import  guarantee  for  cereals  does  not  put  exporting 
countries in  a  position to  assume  a  reciprocal  (i.e. 
identical or equivalent)  commitment  for  cereals. 
2.  Import  guarantees  for  cereals  would  allow  both  importing 
and  exporting countries  to  pursue  production policies of 
their own  without  conforming  to  international discipline. 
But  without  such  discipline,  the  balance  of  the  world 
cereal market  cannot  be  restored.  If the  present  imbalance 
continues,  the political,  commercial  and  agricultural 
consequences  will  be  serious. 
The  EEC,  further  P.elie:ves  that. thE,J  quest  for  securitu 
.implici~ ·.in  the  desire  f9r  import  guarantees  cannot  be' jtisti-
fied  by calling in question  the  marc;in-of-support  method.  For 
the  economic  effects of binding  a  customs  duty  - the  procedure 
in the  :i.nduc,t::rial  part of the  Kennedy  Round  - cannot  be  · 
predicted wlth .as  much  certainty as  the  binding of the  mar~~n 
,..  of support,  whic?  reprps8.?t~  t~:  c~mulative effp.ct pf all 
government  support  measures,  of wh1ch  customs  duties  are  but 
one. , 
(c) 
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The  third objection is that  the  method  of calculating and 
supervising the  application oi the  margin  of  support  h~s net 
been  put  to  the  test,  The  EEC  does  n,)i.- dispute  t:ns  f.·,:;t  1 
which  u-:H.lcubtc(lly  p;ives  thn  membPr-E  of  S;\'':'':~  r;·-::·,:,d.  g:ro'!!<~:.:.:  .for 
lnsj  !l.::-~  C.  ~· v.r:n  ~~ f: :.r t  :::\:~ !l  ~~roGer>!  re  ~  v.~~~.C rn 0 y  B:.l·~~·'C.\ .;~v j  ::.1  Ci.1.  ·_.  ._.:;:1  be 
exe:rcii::;()U  and  der:;.:...s:.ons  te<l~en if pr::.blcms  G~v~u.i..d  clr:{.se. 
Although  the  dissensions  and  difficulties still blocking  the 
adoption of the  plan or  the  principles it embodies  shou1d  not  be 
uno.erestim'Ated,  the  EEC  bcJi(;VCS  ·thctt  \'l:'t..'~h  po:-':. t~.0Hl  d:; te·:'i:JlJ1et tion 
on  all side.""  it sh0u:ld  be  qu.Lte  pocsible  to  re.::;1:l..  te  Wo':ld  ·:lC"~':~1J.tural 
ma~··kets in ,c,uch  a  v;e~,r  as  to  put  .:ln  r.rd  to  ~>t!'•.:  ~.t,';~·.siL  in:l;;:-,lar,(·:-- iT~  ··.~1  all 
the  seriouc agricultural,  comn;c,rcial  and  pal:Lt..Lcal  cons--:quenc~'G  ·;_t; 
entails. 
The  EEC:'  <3  C•)mr.:•.m  ar~ricultural policy  must  there fore  be  completed 
before its  nD~~ti9.1  .. !ng plan  can  be  put  into effect.  Thi~ plan is 
tailored to  c.c;ricl;.·L C'.'r&1  .:-o--operat:i.c:n  ru··~.ng  count  ~·:<.cs  bsi.c~ging to 
the  same  ecor.omic  ctl1C1.  social  syste.n  ao  the  EEC. 
By  practising the  kind  of co-operation proposed  by  the  EEC,  these 
countries will prepare  the  way  for  others  with  different  e~on~~ic and 
social systems  to  take  pnrt  in an  inte:r!.c:,tLJ:n..al  agricultm·::l:i.  rc..L.;cy. 
1.  This  applies  first  and  foremost  to  those  countries where  modern 
methods  of production  and  marketing  hnve  not  yet  been  applied to 
fnrmi.ng..  ffp_ny  of them  are  r.!cmb::rs  of  GATT. 
The  UN  Conference  on Trade  and  Development  held  in  1964  left 
the  follov1ing  questions  unanswered. 
(a)  Vh~t international  commitment  must  the  developed  countries 
assume?  The  views  of  the  ~evelopcd countries themselves  were 
widely  divergent. 
(b)  ~hot 1ntarncttional  commitment  must  the  developing  countr~cs 
OE:;Sll!-;':)?  'J'h-£.s  question  \'JnG  not  even  diSCUSsed,  t]l:Ji1,'~;:  ~  c.'i,~: 
iE  no~  c:.u·~::_-c ':  ~ ng  since it  sh~lu}.,)  h::vc  been  br01: ;;::!  .!jJ  'Ley 
tLc  duvc.J..s::.·::·d  :~01:ntries 1  'Nho  ,,_rc  r;,·_;:.  ,c::<re  of,  nn:.:..  ·~·'-<·'.;:Joe 
ogres  on 1  ~hat  their own  cammicm~~s~ should be. 
Once  accepted,  the  ELC  plan  - or  at  least its principles 
would  provid0  ~}:c  developed  c:r1!.nt. :riG c  not  only with  o.  c :--~,1m0n 
appronc  !1  t n·. ~ .J r•~ .s  .._ J.1e i.-r·  ewn  Cv  r•.,~. -" -:·  :.  '"  l·. ;, .:>  t.  :..' +;  also  ·;.; :~  ~ h  r.t  .:,)  ~:r:; opt 
on  wh·".ch  to  t>::t···-'  ;.::16  no,,:;ot~_at:  -r.:1e  '--3!·:i.cultural  cc:>;;;;:-,ltn,~·::1~3  of 
the  d~~e~oyi~g countries. 
2.  Also  involv~6 arc  th;Jsc  countries in which  a~ricultural under-
takin,ss  d.rr;  no~,  priv.:,tely  01-mr:,r.}  C'\nd  run.  Some  r:f  them  are 
alrcuJy  members  o~  G~TT,  and  ethers  wJ.sh  to  join, .  l 
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,,  Once  accepted,  the  EEC  plan would  give  the  capitalist countries 
!  a  clear idea of the  extent  of  their own  agricultural  commitments  and, 
by  the  same  token,  a  yardstick with  which  to  measure  the  equivalent 
commitments  to  be  assumed  by  the  other countries. 
The  EEC's  common  agricultural policy,  once  completed,  together 
with its Kennedy  Round  plan,  once  accepted,  would  thus  load to  world 
agricultural co-operation along  the  following lines. 
1.  The  starting point  for  such  co-operntion is the  realization that 
the  present  imbalance  between  supply  and  demand  on  world 
agricultural markets  affects  the  agriculture  and  the  rest of the 
economics  of all countries. 
2.  The  purpose  of co-operation is to strike  and  maintain  a  balance. 
3.  The  basic  tenet of  co-operation is to  apportion the  responsibilities 
it entails in accordance  with  a  single  set of rules based  on  the 
level of  development  reached  in the  countries  concerned. 
4.  The  instruments of co-operation are  the  commitments  which all 
countries will  assume  in binding  the  margin of support  and 
concluding  world  agreements  for  certain commodities. 
5.  Procedures  for  supervising  and  extending  co-operation will be 
negotinted by  the  contracting parties at the  regular or other 
meetings  held under  the  auspices  of  GATT  or in pursuance  of 
world  agreements. 
Co-operation of this kind,  once  put  in hand,  will mean  the 
beginnings  of a  v10rld  agricultural policy. 
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